necessity of an integrative system of mass communications to build the social cohesion which is crucial for the reinforcement of democratic procedures. 4 On the other hand, Lerner and Lipset suggested a complex of interrelated social and economic conditions as prerequisites for political democracy."
Using survey data from Middle Eastern countries, Lerner identified urbanization, education, and media growth (or communication) as the essential factors for the process of democratic development. He considered urbanization to be a factor stimulating education, which in turn accelerates media growth and eventually democratic development.
Lipset, on the other hand, by conducting comparative research at the aggregate level with emphasis on the socioeconomic characteristics of societies as causal factors of democratization, initiated a new trend in which the focus is shifted from individual to system characteristics. Lipset's argument, through its expansion by subsequent scholars, started a discussion about the impact of socioeconomic development on political democracy.
Lipset compared mean values and ranges of socioeconomic development for four groups of countries: (1) European and English-speaking stable democracies, (2) European and English-speaking unstable democracies and dictatorships, (3) Latin American democracies and unstable dictatorships, and (4) Latin American stable dictatorships. He suggested a positive linear relationship between levels of socioeconomic development and democratic development. His conclusion was that "economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy, it is a mark of efficiency of the total system." He added, however, that "the stability of a given democratic system depends not only on the systems' efficiency in modernization, but also upon effectiveness and legitimacy of the political systems."6 It is, therefore, possible to conclude that, by considering effectiveness and the legitimacy of the system as well as socioeconomic development, Lipset was arguing for socioeconomic development as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for the establishment and/or maintenance of a democratic political system. Similarly, Coleman classified seventy-five developing countries as competitive, semicompetitive, or authoritarian on the basis of their democratic political performance in the late 1950s.7 Comparing the mean scores of each group on indicators of economic development, as well as the individual scores of countries in each category, Coleman reached two conclusions.
(1) The major hypothesis that economic development and competitiveness are positively correlated is validated when countries are grouped into major differentiating categories of competitiveness and when mean scores of economic development are employed; but (2) the hypothesis is weakened by negative correlations found when the economic scores and relative competitiveness of individual countries are considered. To this should be added the caveat that economic modernization constitutes only one dimension of the ensemble of determinants shaping political institutions and behavior in the countries with which we are concerned [developing countries].8
More sophisticated measures and methods were utilized to test the Lipset and Coleman hypothesis arguing that socioeconomic development and the level of democracy of the system are positively related. Authors developed scale measurements of democracy that are more refined than the common dichotomous perception of democracy. Correlation and regression analyses by Cutright, Cutright and Wiley, Smith, and Coulter provided empirical support for a positive linear relationship between levels of economic development and democracy in a system.9 The linearity of the relationship has been questioned by the "threshold phenomenon" argument of Neubauer and Jackman.'0 These two authors found no significant relationship between the two properties for highly developed countries. However, the implicitly evolutionary thesis suggests that, at least at the lower stages of economic development, increases in economic development level lead to increases in the level of democracy. This contention has not been effectively challenged, and the thesis has dominated the discussions of political democracy for the past thirty years.
On the other hand, it seems fair to question whether such linearity is validly demonstrated even for the less developed countries. The countries which may be classified as middle range developed, in particular, display a conspicuous fluctuation in the level of democracy they have experienced. II The authors who suggested a linear or curvilinear relationship between socioeconomic development and democratization have based their arguments on the findings from cross-national regression analysis of several countries at single time points or, more commonly, separate periods. The high correlation between the two factors and the significant regression coefficients displayed by such data have seemed to support their evolutionary hypothesis.
A Critique of Modernization Theory and the Evolutionary Thesis The validity of modernization theory and its evolutionary thesis of democracy needs to be verified with improved data and measurement. For this purpose answers to the following questions will be sought.
A. 1. Considering a large number of countries at different levels of economic development and democratic performance, can we find a systematic relationship between the levels of economic development and democracy? The participation component includes measures of the extent to which popular will can be reflected in decision-making institutions, which are for the most part in the legislative and executive branches of government.14 If the effective executive, which "refers to the individual who exercises primary influence in shaping major decisions affecting the nation's internal and external affairs," is elected, the country is assigned one point.
The legislative item in the participation component is composed of three different indicators.
1. Legislative Selection: If the legislative body of the government is elected, that is, the "members of the lower house in a bicameral system are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election," two points are assigned. If this body is not elected, meaning that the "legislators are selected by the effective executive, or by means of heredity or ascription," only one point is assigned. No point is assigned if there is no legislature.
2. Legislative Effectiveness: One point is assigned if the legislature is largely ineffective; two points are assigned if it is partially effective; and three points are assigned if it is effective. No points are assigned for the cases of no legislature. In situations where the "legislative activity is essentially of a 'rubber stamp' character," or "domestic turmoil has made the implementation of legislation impossible," or the "effective executive has prevented the legislature from meeting, or otherwise substantially impeded the exercise of its functions," the legislature is considered to be ineffective. In a situation in which the "effective executive's power substantially outweighs, but does not completely dominate that of the legislature," the legislature is considered to be partially effective. The legislative process is defined as effective when there is "significant governmental autonomy by the Zehra F. Arat legislature, including, typically, substantial authority in regard to taxation and disbursement and the power to override executive vetoes of legislation." 3. Competitiveness of the Nomination Procedure: Again, no points are assigned in the absence of a legislature. One point is assigned if the nomination procedure for the legislature is essentially noncompetitive; two points are assigned if the nomination procedure is competitive. The categories of essentially noncompetitive and competitive nomination procedures reflect differences between the degrees to which the nominations are determined in a public arena. The competitive category refers to a process in which the public has an opportunity to influence the options. In countries which have essentially noncompetitive nomination procedures, although competition is allowed, the options are mostly predefined and the choices are dictated by a dominant organ which ultimately provides a single slate of nominees.
Thus, one plus the product of these three scores provides us with the score for the legislative part of the participation component. The sum of the legislative and executive components yields the final score for the participation component.
For measurement of the competitiveness of the political system, two characteristics are used, party legitimacy and party competitiveness. The sum of these two items provides us with the final competitiveness score. The third major component, which refers to civil and political liberties, or conversely the coerciveness of the government, is the most complex of all in terms of operationalization. The standardized scores for the number of government sanctions, which are the "actions taken by authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime or the state itself,"15 within a year are regressed on the standardized scores of the number of social unrest events encountered that year, such as antigovernment demonstrations, assassinations, guerrilla warfare, riots, general strikes, and deaths from domestic violence.'6 The residual values from this regression analysis provide a measure of government coerciveness.17 All governments have coercive power, and they use it to maintain their systems. Since we have no explicit theoretical guidelines for the optimum or reasonable levels of coerciveness, an empirical strategy is utilized. By regressing the number of sanctions employed on the social unrest indicators for each year, we can estimate a line of optimum coerciveness for the real world. If a country employs more sanctions than the others given equal levels of unrest, we can describe it as a more coercive government, but if it employs fewer coercive actions, it can be ranked as less coercive. Then the difference between actual and predicted (estimated) values, the residuals, can provide us with a measure of coerciveness, or suppression of liberties.
Finally, by subtracting the degree of coerciveness'8 from the sum of the other two components we obtain an additive scale to measure the level of democracy. and a significant negative regression coefficient (b2) for its squared value, which refers to the decline after a certain level of economic development is reached.
The regression results of cross-national analysis for thirty different years confirms the findings of Jackman and Neubauer. The log-linear model (2) provided a better fit to the data for almost all years. The average R2 for thirty years is .27 for this model as opposed to .25 for the polynomial model and .20 for the linear model. This finding indicates that at a given time point relatively more developed countries tend to experience more democratic systems but the level of democracy does not reflect any relation for some countries which are located at highest levels of the development measure. Moreover, this relationship appears to be stable over time. 20 As can be seen in Table 1 , the same relationship is observed when the scores of democracy for all countries for all of the available years are regressed on socioeconomic development. However, it should be noted that such an analysis of pooled data (longitudinal and cross-sectional data combined) treats each year for each country as a separate observation. It does not capture the pattern followed by an individual country over time.
Thus, to check if this curvilinear relationship holds when the relationship is studied for each country, scores of democracy for each country from eight to thirty years21 are employed for the same three regression models. Contrary to the results from the cross-national analyses, the findings from the longitudinal application of data to the three models suggest more complex relationships. Although the short period of time with available data prevents us from deriving any comprehensive conclusions, the patterns manifested by each country can be sorted under seven major categories, as in Table 2 , to display the variety of relationships as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The no relationship category includes the countries which display no systematic relationship in terms of the three models tested, at .05 significance level.
Countries are included in one of the linear categories if there is a significant positive or negative linear relationship (positive-linear and negative-linear respectively) observed between economic development and democracy and neither of the curvilinear models provides a better fit to the data (a significant increase in the explained variance, that is, a significantly high R2). While the positive-linear category includes the countries which become more democratic over time with increasing levels of socioeconomic development, the negative-linear category refers to the change in opposite direction where socioeconomic development appears with decline in the level of democracy.
Positive-curvilinear and negative-curvilinear categories refer to the countries where the log-linear model provides the best fit to the data. The positive-curvilinear category covers the countries which display an increase in the level of democracy with increasing levels of economic development until a certain level of economic development is reached and no relationship after that economic development level. Similarly, the negative-curvilinear category refers to continuous decline in the level of democracy with increasing economic development up to a certain level of economic development.
Countries are classified as curvilinear positive-negative or curvilinear negative-positive if the second degree polynomial model provides a better fit in comparison to the others. The If the evolutionary thesis suggested by the modernization theorists is to hold, most of the "developing countries" should appear in the positive-linear category, and most of the "developed" countries should appear in the No-relationship category. However, as seen in Table 2 , only a few countries fit the models suggested by modernization theory: out of 120 countries only eight (even though all can be considered as developing countries) experience increasing levels of democracy with increasing levels of economic development, and the developed countries with the rest of the developing countries are spread in the other categories, each of which suggests a different pattern of relationship.
On the basis of these findings it can be concluded that increasing levels of economic development do not necessarily lead to higher levels of democracy, even for the less developed countries. Such a relationship, which has been observed through the study of cross-national data, suggests only that at a given time point the countries with more democratic political systems happen to be the ones which are economically more developed. As Rustow emphasized in his critique of the "Lipset-Cutright genre," "correlation is not the same as causation."22
Developing countries, on the other hand, do not display a linear relationship, but rather more complex patterns or no systematic relationship at all. In fact, most of these countries, especially the ones which are located in the middle of the development axis, experience higher levels of instability, a continuous back and forth shift, on the scale of democracy. Huntington classifies these unstable political systems in his "cyclical model" of democratization and divides them into two groups on the basis of their regularity in oscillation between two forms of systems. In countries such as Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Ghana, and Nigeria, where the oscillation between despotism and democracy is quite regular, "the alternation of democracy and despotism is the political system;" in others, "the shift from a stable despotism to a stable democracy is a change in political systems."23 Democratic Instability and Economic Development A measure of "instability" in regard to democracy, based on the scale of democracy discussed above, was developed to identify patterns of oscillation. For each country, the sum of the absolute values of the annual change in democracy scores was divided by the number of years in the time period covered (which varies for each country according to the date of independence and data availability) to obtain an average score of "change in the level of democracy." This calculation follows the logic that, the more frequent and larger the shifts a country displays on the scale of democracy, the higher "democratic instability" score it will get. Out of 124 countries included here, Sudan (3.15), Pakistan (2.67), Burma (2.53), Argentina (2.32), and Peru (2.16) composed the most unstable group; while Austria (.03), Switzerland (.04), Saudi Arabia (.048), Sweden (.05), and New Zealand (.06) appeared to be the most stable countries, where the mean value for instability is .87 (see Table 3 ). It should be noted, however, that the instability score does not measure political instability in general but measures instability specifically in regard to the level of democracy. That is, countries which rank high on this scale experience higher rates of shifts between relatively more authoritarian and democratic systems. To test the hypothesis that the middle range developed countries (MDCs) experience higher levels of democratic instability than the least developed (LDC) and advanced developed (ADC) countries, a regression model which captures the curvilinearity of the relationship between economic development and instability is utilized. The instability scores for all of the countries listed in Table 3- In the second degree polynomial model, if the regression coefficient b, is positive but b2 is negative and they are both significant, we can say that there is a curvilinear relationship between the instability of the political system and the development level of the country. Economic development appears with democratic instability until a certain level is reached, and further development appears with higher levels of stability in regard to the level of democracy of the political system.
The results of the analysis are reported in Table 4 . The findings display that an evolutionary thesis based on the analysis of cross-national data for a fixed time point is misleading. Our findings support the hypothesis that MDCs experience more frequent and/or larger shifts between more and less democratic systems as opposed to LDCs and ADCs.
In fact, if some of the extreme cases seen in Figure 2 , which is the plot of instability scores on the logarithmic values of average energy consumption per capita, are dropped, the During the last decade, however, a new wave of interest has arisen to look beyond modernization and economic development. Collier's study on Latin American countries identified the timing of development as an important factor. 24 Bollen developed regression models to study the impact of the size of Protestant population and the extent of state control over the economy, in addition to the timing of development and economic development level. 25 Linz and his coauthors made a major contribution when they studied the impact of the efficiency and effectiveness of the system on its breakdown. 26 In an effort to explain MDCs' inability to maintain their once promising democratic systems, the author identified inefficiency and ineffectiveness of governments in recognizing the social and economic rights of their citizens, which eventually threatens the system's legitimacy.27 These quantitative and historical studies, combined with theoretically inspired case studies,28 promise more qualified answers to the questions of democratization and instability.
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